




5. URBAN DESIGN AND PUBLIC SPACE STRATEGY: YOKOHAMA 1963 — 2006

_Chapter 5: Urban Design and Public Space Strategy, Yokohama



5.1 INTRODUCTION

While chapter 3 discussed *multiple* kinds of new alternative public space over a period of 4-odd decades and chapter 4 focused on the long-term evolution of *one particular kind* of public space (POPS) within its institutional context, chapter 5 finally takes a longitudinal, long-term perspective on the understanding of public space, as reflected in urban governance and planning culture, within *one particular place*, namely Japan's second largest city and one of the most progressive local governments, Yokohama City.


In a long-term strategic planning vision, which was developed during the second half of the 1960s by young, progressive planners and politically backed by the newly elected reform mayor, in Yokohama the creation of a comprehensive public space system was outlined from early on. It would connect major parks, river fronts, the harbour, historical quarters and traditional entertainment and shopping districts through a matrix of urban promenades. These would then contribute to an integration of a downtown area, which was segmented in two town centres, separated by the expanse of a Mitsubishi owned shipyard. Underlying concern was also the reclamation of a human-scale pedestrian environment from an increasingly vehicle dominated city planning. The utilisation of private initiative, coupled with frugal, strategic allocation of public resources would lead to an incremental realisation of this vision.

With its emphasis on participation and urban design on the one hand and pro-active, controlled utilisation of private initiative, the chapter takes up a hybrid position between the preceding chapters 3 and 4 and at the same time outlines the possibilities of a more comprehensive, integrated and ultimately more active municipal urban planning culture.

5.2 EVOLUTION OF YOKOHAMA'S DISTINCT PLANNING CULTURE

5.2.1 Background: Rapid Urban Growth, Environmental Crisis and Loss of Identity

With 3.5 million inhabitants Yokohama is Japan's second largest city. After the opening of the country in the mid-19th Century, it assumed the function as port of Tōkyō and gateway to the West. Until today the city takes pride in its distinct local culture as physically manifested in an ample heritage of Western style buildings. This identity was challenged by the rapid urban growth beginning from the 1960s and the massive concentration of heavy industries in the Keihin industrial zone. The allied occupation of the historic Kannai area delayed war reconstruction until the late 1950s and diverted further urban growth towards the fringes. In only two decades the population doubled from 1.5 million in 1963 to 3 million in 1983. The sprawling suburbanisation led to a factual absorption of Yokohama into the greater metropolitan region – making it morphologically an inextricable part of Tōkyō. With the city threatened to become a bed town and environmental conditions getting out of control, the political pressure grew.



Graphic 5.1: Urban expansion of Yokohama City (red circles) in relation to its mighty rival Tōkyō in 1917, 1932, 1956, 1965 (from left to right).

(From Yokohama 1981: 102)

5.2.2 Reform Mayor and new Urban Governance

In April 1963 the only 47 year old candidate of a progressive platform emphasising regional democracy and social welfare for Yokohama's citizen, Asukata Ichio, took office as mayor (1963-1978). This was part of the bigger political picture of the electoral crisis of the ruling LDP, which set in at the beginning of the 1960s. After the boom years of explosive economic growth a strong sense of political crisis was triggered by increasing awareness of the

tremendous environmental problems, caused by the unconditional pro-economic development policy of the LDP led government. Sorensen describes the political climate as follows: "(...) while local government had been until the mid-1960s the almost exclusive territory of conservative politicians, by the late 1960 conservative dominance was clearly on the wane. Although opposition parties had focused their energies on national politics after the war and during the 1950s, from the early 1960s they more actively fielded candidates and pushed reform agendas at the local level. This was translated into a steady growth of reformist city councillors, mayors, and governors during the 1960s and early 1970s" (Sorensen 2002: 212). Together with Kyoto, Yokohama was the first of Japan's big cities, voting a series of reformist governors and mayors into office. In the local government elections of 1967 another rush of progressive candidates were elected, both in central areas of major cities and in rural areas. Most threatening for the LDP "was the fact that progressive candidates won the governorship of key prefectures as well, most notably of Tōkyō by Minobe Ryōkichi in 1967" (ibid).

After the elections Asukata expounded his initial policy principles like creating a "city government, which cherishes the children" (*Kodomo wo taisetsu ni suru Shisei* 子供を大切にする市政), or the creation of "a city, where everybody wants to live" (*Dare demo sumitakunaru Toshizukuri* 誰でも住みたくなる都市づくり), aiming at the weak of society (Tamura 2006: 49). These were intended as symbolical statements, showing the citizen-centred attitude of the new administration in an era of rapid urban growth and worsening environmental conditions. For little money a number of showcase symbolic public spaces like 'kids' squares' and 'kid's pools' were created as physical manifest of the new policies. Another main task he outlined was "correcting the distortions caused by the developing of heavy and chemical industries and the various problems accompanying urbanisation" (Cited in Ôkawa 1990: 200). Heavy industrialisation in the Keihin industrial belt and sprawling suburbanisation in the hinterlands of the city had created a broad range of environmental problems such as air and water pollution, destruction of the natural environment and, resulting from that, floods and avalanches. Another severe problem was the overburdening increase in road traffic and the suffocating congestion of downtown streets (See chapter 3, §3.2.1). Contrary to his predecessors in office, Hiranuma and Nakarai, which were mainly concerned with the development of the port and the Keihin industrial belt, Asukata was envisaging a more balanced and ultimately more sustainable urban development in placing his emphasis on public welfare and education, considering the quality of life of the citizens and the economic progress as equally important.

An Integrated Blueprint for the Future

Asukata began recruiting a team of young, likeminded progressive planning consultants to whom he entrusted the drafting of a future development concept. One of them, Tamura Akira would become head of the newly established Planning and Coordination Bureau in 1968 and later also one of the leading figures in Japanese urban design theory and practice. In January 1965 Asukata presented his blue print for a comprehensive future development of Yokohama to the public. The plan was called 'City Planning for Yokohama' but more interesting was the sub heading, which stressed a radical departure from established top-down governance as it evoked a "Future Yokohama, designed by its citizen (*Shimin ga tsukuru Yokohama no Mirai* 市民が作る横浜の未来)" (Yokohama City 1965). The city would literally become a more public space. Ôkawa (1990) points further out that the priority of protecting the living conditions of the citizens was extended in consecutive plans such as the 'Yokohama Comprehensive Plan to build an International Port City' of 1966, or the 'Yokohama Comprehensive Plan' of 1973.



Graphic 5.2: The plan did not have the appearance of a typical policy statement, or of normal planning documents. Instead, much emphasis was put on explaining the guiding ideas in clear words so that every citizen would understand. External graphic artists were commissioned to illustrate the plan with legible graphics, which were intermixed with images of citizens from various walks of life. (From Yokohama 1965: 32)

Tamura (2006: 58) outlines the following 6 characteristics, which came to distinguish the new citizen-centred urban governance under the Asukata administration from traditional government authority. These principles had then also a great influence on the subsequent development policies:

- 1) The city acted as representative for the citizens and took any effort to advocate the local public good against the national government if necessary. It would draw up strategic, comprehensive, long-term development plans.



- 2) The city would not request financial support from the national government and would be thus independent from its directives. Instead own, independent and more suitable policies were devised.
- 3) Minimisation of public spending in order to recover financial strength, and to demonstrate to tax payers an efficient urban administration.
- 4) Far-reaching cooperation with the private sector in order to utilise methods and know-how, previously not available in the public administration.¹⁶²
- 5) The 6 initial projects would trigger many further related projects and would thus initiate a broad urban regeneration.
- 6) Overcoming the vertical segmentation of the local government through systems, which allow for the comprehensive and unitary implementation of policies.


Urban Renaissance through 6 Big Projects

Core element of Asukata's 1965 plan was a package of the so-called '6 Big Projects'. Taken together these projects would lead to a comprehensive, long-term urban revitalisation over the next decades. The 6 big projects were:

- 1) Renewal of the city's central section (Yokohama City 1965: 48-51);
- 2) Reclamation of land along the coast of Kanazawa (ibid: 52-5);
- 3) Development of Kôhoku New Town (ibid: 56-9);
- 4) Construction of a municipal subway system (ibid: 60-1);
- 5) Construction of a highway system (ibid: 62-3); and
- 6) Construction of a bay bridge as direct link to Tōkyō (ibid: 64-7).

The symbolically most significant project was the renewal of the city centre. While the old Kannai centre had been occupied by the allied forces until the mid 1950s, war reconstruction could only start after a long delay, which further spurred a haphazard development at the fringes. The businesses, which were once located here had relocated either to the new city centre in the vicinity of Yokohama station or directly to the Marunouchi central business area in Tōkyō. The plan called for the formation of a new integrated city centre, which would comprise the old Kannai centre as well as the new centre around Yokohama station. Complemented by landfills, the Minato Mirai 21 project would be placed in between as a connector and third centre.


¹⁶² Thus, at this time already first ideas were discussed on how to integrate private initiative into the development strategy of the city, long before words like Minkatsu (mid-1980s), PFI, or PPP (after 2000) came in use.



5.3-4: To the left is the concept diagram for the creation of a new unified downtown out of three heterogeneous areas around Yokohama station (top), Mitsubishi wharf (middle) and Kannai area (below). Three years later the green axis concept was developed as a concretisation of the previous vision. A network of public spaces would serve to connect the three centres along the waterfront and in the hinterland form a network of major public parks.

(From Yokohama 1965: 48 (left); Yokohama 1981: 87 (right))

The second 'Big project' was the creation of a landfill off the coast of Kanazawa. A new mixed use city would develop here with a close proximity of recreational, residential and work functions. More importantly, the landfill would serve as relocation site for factories, hitherto located within residential areas. Here they caused severe environmental conflicts, but were also not able to expand their operations. Through the relocation businesses had the opportunity to consolidate and at the same time the residential environment was improved through renewal projects and parks on these brownfields.



Graphic 5.5: Ôkata and Sasaki (1990: 203) point out "this area holds the key to the entire configuration of Yokohama." The landfill allowed for the later relocation of the Mitsubishi shipyard from the site, which would become Minato Mirai 21. Every dot in the graphic represents one factory, which was relocated to the Kanazawa landfill. (From Yokohama 1982: 99)

The third project was the development of Kôhoku Newtown. Different from other Newtown developments such as Tama, Kôhoku was not meant as a project for quickly countering the aggravating housing shortages, but rather as part of an integrated strategy for controlling the rapid haphazard growth and as a new future development model. From the outset the plan outlined an area, which would be built up and another area, which would be permanently kept open and which would serve as recreational public space, while other parts would be for agricultural use. Although the Newtown Act, would have secured central government funding for the acquisition of large chunks of land for public housing, the city opted for a different approach. Taking central government money would have meant to be committed to central government's control. Instead conventional land readjustment was used, under the unprecedented cooperation of all the involved landowners, the city and related public authorities. This way, the original landowners would stay attached to the town, which would help in turn the formation of a new local community. This project was initially meant to serve as an experiment for further coming Newtown projects in the City, but the rapid urban growth had filled up all potential sites before the project was completed. The unique points here were thus the creation of an integrated green matrix or green system, preservation and promotion of agriculture and citizen participation through the land readjustment projects

The remaining three large-scale infrastructure projects of the 6 big projects sought to complement the strategic development principles. The subway system would link Kôhoku and other sub-centres directly to the central Kannai area. As it was perpendicular to the suburban commuter lines connecting to Tôkyô, no direct connection to the capital was established. This was meant to reduce commuting to Tôkyô and promote the stable growth of a chain of Yokohama sub-centres along the line. When a commission under Yasojima Yoshinosuke examined ways of extending subway operations from Tôkyô to Kôhoku in the late 1980s (the era of the Nakasone Cabinet's Minkatsu policy) and establish a direct link, the City successfully intervened. It argued that such policy would be counterproductive to true decentralisation of Tôkyô, as every place along the line would instantly turn into a bed town; losing its own identity.

The highway system was meant to drain the traffic from the central city area, which could then reconfigured into a more pedestrian friendly environment. The bay bridge finally, would serve as a new civic symbol and directly link central Yokohama to Tôkyô.

Institutionalising the new Policy Objectives

Backed by the mayor, Tamura Akira established a Planning and Coordination Bureau in 1968, which aligned the agendas of all related departments and facilitated internal teamwork¹⁶³ for a coordinated realisation of the 6 big projects. The new citizen centred attitude, declared by the administration didn't remain a lip service.

From the very earliest stages on, the administration encouraged partnerships with the citizens and the business community. Besides increasing the acceptance of projects among the citizens, it also allowed the administration to present national government and relevant public agencies a clear-cut strategy, based on and backed by a consensus with the citizens. The traditional vertical decision-making process was replaced by a goal-oriented partnership approach between the private and the public sector, between civil society and the public (Tamura 2006).

In 1970 Japan's first municipal Urban Design Office¹⁶⁴ was set up (Nishimura 1994), which began to operate along the following seven objectives (Note: in bold letters appear principles, directly related to public space):

- 1) **Provision of a coherent and pleasant pedestrian environment;**
- 2) Valuation of distinctive natural features such as topography and greenery;
- 3) Valuation of cultural and historical assets;
- 4) **Provision of abundant greenery and open space;**
- 5) **Provision of open space along rivers and the sea;**
- 6) **Creation of more places, where people can come in contact with each other and communicate, and**
- 7) Seeking urban beauty

163 The hierarchical and vertically segmented national administration is referred to as Tatewari Gyōsei (縦割行政). Municipal government departments communicate directly with the corresponding national ministries with prefectures as intermediaries. Consequently local projects must go through a serpentine approval process by multiple ministries and agencies before being finally implemented. There is little lateral coordination between the different vertical administrative strands or even between local government departments which often follow antagonistic agendas.

164 Members of the urban design team were exempted from the notorious job rotation which usually takes place every 2-3 years. Though its purpose is enabling the staff to work on different tasks and prevent corruption, in the field of urban planning it obstructed the building up experience and coherent management of long-term urban development projects (Kobayashi 2005b: 20).

The overall motive here can be best summarised as 'seeking publicness' (*Kōkyōsei wo tsukyū* 公共性を追求) (Nishiwaki et al. 1992: 25). This would be achieved through a *process* of creating a sophisticated public space network, linking major parks, historical and cultural assets, shopping streets as well as the water front (river and seaside) and involving citizens and business community.

Gradually this network would be complemented through public projects (promenades, greenways, squares) and guided private development (utilisation of UEDS §5.3.1, MCD §5.3.2) under integrated utilisation of all available planning instruments. Thus, urban design was not seen as mere beautification activity but as a *process* to mobilise citizen participation through flanking 'soft' measures (conferences, exhibitions, opinion polls, or workshops) and promote local identity formation.

Under the auspices of the Planning and Coordination Bureau the Urban Design Office began to concretise the earlier established long-term planning strategy for the comprehensive development of the city's urban public spaces from as early as the beginning of the 1970s. The significance of urban design is outlined as follows:

"In order to create urban spaces that have appeal and display distinctive features appropriate for the city, urban design activities must coordinate the relationship between (...) facilities, residents, and the various core groups, participating in the urban design planning process for the entire city. For this reason the targets of these urban public spaces cover both the private and public sectors. The perspective at the centre of these activities is characterised by the citizens, with their eagerness to learn through experience, and their value of public open spaces" (Yokohama n/a 4).

Ôkata (1990b: 206) explains that urban design in Yokohama clearly started as a means to distinguish the city from its giant rival Tōkyō to the north. Therefore the key to urban renewal is "to create an attractive, distinctive city with a quality urban environment".

5.2.3 Perspectivistic Incrementalism and Learning Processes

Horisaki (2000) provides a detailed account on the evolution and gradual expansion of the Urban Design Office's tasks. Initially the historical centres around Yamashita Park and Nihon Ôdori as well as the scenic Yamate area, Bashamichi, Isezakichô, and Motomachi were in the focus. Over time the scope broadened. These initial projects of the urban design team functioned as catalyser projects in that new techniques of cooperative planning and design control were tested out here and became later institutionalised in new planning tools for a wider application. The projects served not only to demonstrate to the citizens the commitment of the administration. They also helped to establish an increased awareness for urban beauty within the engineering dominated planning administration, and highlighted the need for close cooperation among local government departments by transcending disciplinary lines.

Another remarkable fact about the Urban Design Office is its exemption from the typical job-rotation¹⁶⁵, otherwise a mark of public service in Japan. Usually every two to three years, a public servant is rotated to a different job. The exemption of the urban designer facilitated then the building up of expertise and know-how. Also the continuity of important projects was safeguarded. This was made possible by the special commitment of mayor Asukata and the close cooperation with Tamura. Until today, only the employees in the urban design section are exempted from the job rotation system.

Tamura (2006) makes it very clear that urban design and comprehensive planning in Yokohama were not a readymade strategy from the outset. Rather it was a long, incremental learning process, in which instruments and techniques were tested in initial catalyser cases, and when they proved useful they became new planning instruments for general application. Also the spectrum of activities and the target areas gradually broadened over the years.


165 On that point refer to Vogt (2001). In order to prevent corruption and abuse of power in the Japanese public service, every two to three years a job rotation takes place. Through this a flexibilisation of the staff is achieved who have to learn constantly new skills. One drawback of this system is, however, that it also prevents to develop profound experience and expertise in one specific field. Especially in city planning experience and expertise are prime virtues and to acquire them one needs to be engaged in the field for a long time. Another problem is also, that except for the urban design section in Yokohama and some progressive wards and cities (Setagaya in Tôkyô e.g.) few specially trained urban designers are hired, which means that mostly civil engineers, architects, or people with other backgrounds are handling development permissions or building confirmations, but often lack the skills and insights to adequately judge planning proposals from an urban design perspective.



Highway Dispute and Creation of Ôdori Green Axis (1968-1978)

The initial foci of Tamura's urban design activities were the pressing problems concerning expressway and subway construction and how to reconcile these with an overall balanced urban development and good urban form. An elevated expressway had been planned by the traffic authorities, which would have entered the city from the North West. Around the city hall it would have turned south east and run atop of an old canal. This would have dissected the Kannai area in three parts and it would have also obliterated the strategic green axis plan of 1968, which had envisioned turning the canal into the cities major green axis with the municipal subways system running underneath. Against the massive resistance of higher-tier government levels and without much support from other municipal departments, Tamura achieved that the highway would later run underground throughout the Kannai area. Instead of turning atop of the old canal it would run further south-east until it reached the river and then from there turn south-west (See Graphic 5.6 (below)). This way Ôdori Park was saved from an existence in the shadow of the highway, as it had been proposed in intermediate stages before (See Tamura 2006: 64-90).

Mayor Asukata and Tamura Akira claimed to represent in this process the overall standpoint of the citizens, while other city departments acted more or less like lower-tier branch offices, bound by the instructions of the respective higher-tier prefectural and national government authorities. The new Planning and Coordination Bureau was thus standing very much alone against a strong coalition of hostile municipal planning departments and the national ministries behind them. Tamura recalls that MoC agitated against him: "People like Tamura cannot be trusted" ... because he acted as agent of a new independent minded city government and questioned to implement projects, which he was ordered to carry out by the ministries. For many other municipal civil servants it was without question at that time to prioritise orders from above over acting for the best interest of the city. The new Planning and Coordination Bureau became the core of a new citizen-centred government (ibid 82). The project caused massive conflicts *within* the local government and with the ministries. Very bitter battles had been fought around it, but without it the newly established office would have had no authority in the future. Therefore theses conflicts were not avoidable for the sake of the evolution of a comprehensive planning and a government for the people.





Graphic 5.6 (previous page): Evolution of downtown urban design projects until 1974 (top), 1975-1980 (centre), after 1981 (below). (From Yokohama 1982: 118)

Building up Expertise and Awareness

The project served as the most important catalyser project for the staff of the Planning and Coordination Bureau itself, as well as to develop a standing in the general public as how to define the new ideas of comprehensive planning, urban design and promote ideas of urban beauty. Further educating the staff on the task was an important policy of subsequent projects. Different people from different backgrounds would be introduced to the team. Young staff from other departments would be circulating in, 'educated' in the new urban design policies, 'form' their attitude towards the new urban governance for the people and circulate them out in order to emanate the new ideas. Tamura also sought to introduce external/ non-government expertise in order to bring new know-how and fresh approaches into the administration. As he himself had a background as an employee of a big security company, followed by years of work as private planning consultant, he sought to hire people with business background in order to promote more economic expertise. These initial department members then helped to set up Yokohama's peculiar planning system, entered higher positions in subsequent years, succeeded Tamura after he had left office, or took up teaching positions at prestigious facilities of higher education, where they dispersed their expertise and promoted the emanation of Yokohama's peculiar urban design approach.

Initiating Minato Mirai

Minato Mirai 21 (MM21) is often referred to as a redevelopment of a Mitsubishi brownfield but Tamura strongly rejects this notion (ibid. 112). Different from any other later redevelopment in and around Tōkyō the process started here much earlier and the relocation of the Mitsubishi owned shipyard was not inherent at all to economic necessities. The site became a part of the strategic project to reinforce the central city and to connect both existing city centres in Kannai and Yokohama Station through a new urban core. At the time this plan had been drawn up, the shipyard there was in full operation and prospering. Furthermore, the company would not relocate its operations abroad, as did other companies in the production sector during the 1980s, but transfer it to the new landfill near Kanazawa –another one of the big projects. The site was cleared on purpose for a development, which had been mapped out two decades earlier.

Other typical large-scale redevelopments, which started in the 1980s under the slogan of Nakasone's Minkatsu policy, resulted from brownfields, which occurred 'suddenly' because of economic restructuring and relocation, but were not part of strategic city-wide revitalisation schemes as was the case in Yokohama. Only after it became clear that the facilities would relocate, politics were devised for dealing with the available land (See chapter 4, example of redevelopment of JNR freight yard Shiodome §4.3.4).

As early as 1963 first examinations for a utilisation of the area started and in the following year mayor Asukata presented the first plans as part of his 'City Centre Reinforcement Plan' (later project 1 of the 6 big projects). More than 10 years passed after the mayor and the chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had principally agreed on the relocation of the factory. For unclear reasons Mitsubishi didn't announce, how much land they needed after their relocation to the Kanazawa landfill and the corporate chair persons kept on changing without reaching a conclusion. Finally an agreement was concluded to relocate until 1978 and begin to redevelop the area. Due to the economic slump of the late 1970s Mitsubishi requested a two years moratorium in the target year, while Asukata (1965-78) left office.

He was succeeded by the 62-year old conservative Saigô Michikazu (1978-90), a career bureaucrat and former vice minister of the Home Ministry. This situation represented the wider erosion of reformist administrations who had assumed office since the late 1960s. The new mayor was not willing to take any risks in initiating, carrying through and backing new daring projects, but on the other hand he allowed for the continued realisation of the 6 big projects along the older strategic development plans of his predecessor.

In 1989 an Exposition was held in Minato Mirai for the opening, inspired by the successful Expo in Kobe's Harbourland.¹⁶⁶ At the time it was felt that an international conference centre was missing in the Kantô region, while Kansai had the Kyôto international conference centre since 1966 (Ôtani Sachio). Mayor Saigô pressed therefore for the construction of such facility. Ironically, although the centre was labelled '*international* conference centre', the city of Yokohama had to shoulder the largest burden; more than half of the construction costs and the complete maintenance costs.

166 Different from Kobe, however, the event was not used to create a complete new identity for reclaimed land that hadn't existed before. In Yokohama, the site had always been visible and with many citizens working there, had always been a part of the everyday life.


At the same time new competitors had evolved in Odaiba and Makuhari, further increasing the financial pressure. At the opportunity of the construction of Mitsubishi's Landmark Tower the preservation of the old stone dock (1897) at the foot of the planned tower was decided. This would help to develop a distinguishing, more authentic identity vis-à-vis competing waterfront developments around Tōkyō Bay. The later more in detail discussed Urban Environmental Design System (UEDS, *Shigaichi Kankyō Sekkei Seido*, §5.3.1), a variant of the national Comprehensive Design System (See chapter 4, §4.2.1), was used to preserve the dock as important historic public space. A waiver of building height restrictions convinced Mitsubishi Estate (MEC) to preserve the dock. For a total cost of 4 billion Yen 16.000 stones were numbered, disassembled and after the completion of the tower, reassembled again—all at the expense of MEC. In the next section we shall see now, how and when Yokohama city began to utilise guided private developments to complement its public space network.

5.2.4 Initial Guidance of Private Development

Symbolic Public Space around Yamashita Park

After the initial symbolic public space, Kusunoki Square in front of the city hall, had been completed in 1971 by the young urban design¹⁶⁷ team around Kuniyoshi Naoyuki and Iwasaki Shunsuke, their attention turned towards Yamashita Park, Japan's first waterfront park. The park had been created as part of the 1923 earthquake reconstruction project (See chapter 2, §2.5) and had been occupied by the allied forces until the late 1950s. After the war no land readjustment was carried out in its vicinity and therefore the sidewalks were extremely narrow. In the sidewalk section stood also full-grown, tall trees, which meant that if new buildings were to be built here from the 1970s on, the trees would penetrate into the building sites, making their preservation difficult. Also their trunks further narrowed the sidewalks and obstructed the pedestrian circulation. Under normal circumstances a widening of the sidewalks would have required lengthy city planning procedures and the acquisition of land by the city. This would have been too time consuming and costly however.

167 Many members of the urban design team had studied abroad: Iwasaki in Harvard (under Maki Fumihiko) or Taguchi in Manchester for example. Like Tamura himself, many became influential teachers and advocates of urban design in later years (Tamura 2006: 245).



Graphic 5.7: The graphic shows a section of privately created open spaces, along the park promenade, north of Yamashita Park. The red dotted line shows the property boundary at the north side of the plots. The open spaces created on the private building sites are part of an integrated public space network across property boundaries. For a unified appearance the City provided the paving materials to the builders. Pair Square (right) is formed through two corner recess spaces, which form an integrated open space across a cross road.

(Adapted from Yokohama 1981: 101-2)

In the meantime many new buildings would have sprung up, replacing the older low and unefficient existing buildings. Moreover, as the adjacent buildings are located south of the park, new, higher structures, built on the property line would have cast the park in shadow and making it ultimately less attractive to use. For all these reasons Tamura and the urban design team opted once more for administrative guidance and pre-project consultations with landowners who had expressed their concrete development intentions. The first project was the Kanagawa Prefectural Hall and the neighbouring Chamber of Industry of Commerce. The urban design team negotiated with both builders to the extent that they accepted to take back the building line 3 meters, thus significantly widening the pedestrian space along Yamashita Park Avenue. Around the road intersection separating both developments, each building design would also offer a small corner square POPS. Combined, both plazas would form a compound larger square across the road; thus the appellation 'Pair Square'. It would also serve as a symbolic entrée to Yamashita Park for pedestrians, arriving from the inner Kannai area. From there after any new development along the park was required to provide a setback of 3 meters from the fronting park road in order to create a broad and attractive promenade, and 1.5 meters along any other street. Drop-off zones and service entrances as well as exits to parking facilities were to be located in the side streets in order not to disturb the activities, taking place on the promenade. Through this informal guidance the City of Yokohama acquired a representative park promenade at almost zero cost.



Graphic 5.8: Machizukuri Council District (MCD) in the vicinity of Yamashita Park and Nihon Ōdori. The red circle marks the Pair Square, which became in the early 1970s the catalyser case for guided private development, and its later institutionalisation in the Machizukuri Council District system (MCD, §5.3.2). (Adapted from <http://www.city.yokohama.jp/me/toshi/dtech/kyogi/>)

Urban Promenades

The protection and preservation of pedestrian spaces from motorisation became an ever increasing challenge during the 1970s. The road building projects at that time paid little to no attention to pedestrians, prioritising cars over everything. The ruling attitude is best demonstrated with the proliferation of pedestrian overpasses and traffic squares. Spaces, which made one societal group of pedestrians, make detours for the convenience of another societal group of vehicle drivers (Aoki 2004). There was also a strong need to protect the weak such as children, the aged and handicapped.

Between 1974 and 1977 promenades from the 3 Kannai Stations Sakuragichō, Kannai and Ishikawachō were built, which would establish an attractive connection to the then only large inner city attraction Yamashita Park. The promenade construction was also a means for the new administration to physically manifest its reform drive in public space. It showed the citizens that something was changing, at a time when the other big development projects would not yield any visible results for at least another decade.

Promenades were therefore a highly immediate and symbolic showcase project. The concept of these promenades with its emphasis on sign design, colour tiles and maps embedded in the sidewalk inspired many other cities (See Silk Road in Suginami, chapter 3, §3.3.4).

Turning Roads into Pedestrian Havens


Inspired by the famous example of Asahikawa (See chapter 3, §3.2.1) and encouraged by the pedestrian paradises in Tōkyō's Ginza or New York's Fifth Avenue, pedestrianisation projects were also advanced in Yokohama. The initial catalyser example for that became Bashamichi in 1973, one of the oldest modern streets in Japan, having featured the first gas lights in public space.

Around this time Yokohama's Kannai Shōtengais Bashamichi, Isezakichō and Motomachi were still very weak because of the long-lasting occupation, the infrastructure backlog, and the evolution of the Diamond underground shopping mall at Yokohama station as a potent competitor since 1963. Both city and local business identified the urgent need for revitalisation and jointly worked out a 'Bashamichi Constitution' (*Bashamichi Kenpō*), which would induce and control the unified revitalisation of the shopping street. The concept proposed to narrow down the road by 2 meters and widen the sidewalks. An additional setback of 1.5 meters was stipulated for the private building sites, as well as the creation of corner squares, as we have seen in the previous example of Yamashita Park (See also Graphic 5.7). The roof of the Shōtengai arcade would be removed in order to create a pedestrian space with an open air feel.¹⁶⁸ This was important in order to develop a distinction vis-à-vis the new Diamond mall under Yokohama station.¹⁶⁹

Also street furniture, public art and Meiji Period telephone booths would be integrated and iron rails removed, which had hitherto strictly separated sidewalks and road.

168 As previously discussed in Chapter 4, §4.2.1 the high valuation of open-air pedestrian urban spaces is expressed through the efficient open space coefficients in incentive zoning. Initially, the highest bonus floor area values resulted from the provision of outdoor spaces such as urban square-type and sidewalk widening-type POPS. Underground- and indoor-type POPS yielded only a much reduced bonus floor area (See Graphic 4.3). As discussed in the OMY case study (Chapter 4, §4.3.8), the coefficients for the creation of indoor POPS were significantly increased for the first time, in order to protect the unique cityscape of Marunouchi, marked by regular, closed street walls.

169 At the time the Diamond Mall was the biggest shopping centre in Japan and had the largest retail turnover per square meter shopping space.



Graphic 5.9: Section of Bashamichi (right), crossing of depressed highway and the fully pedestrianised Isezaki Mall (left). In Bashamichi the effect of the design agreement is clearly visible: around the street intersections street corner plazas are created through wall setbacks. (From Yokohama 1981: 101)

Thus a highly attractive, integrated street space was envisioned, which was no longer dominated by the car but sought to provide a cohabitation of pedestrians and drivers. Until these innovative and at the time daring plans had been finally realised, long battles had to be fought against the municipal police department, in charge for traffic safety. In order to thwart the scheme it was for example stated that a shared street space would be too dangerous and that the sculptures and benches would obstruct an efficient traffic circulation. Also branch heads of banks and security companies, located here, opposed the project. Not being local landowners themselves, they rather identified with their companies rather than with the particular place. Corporate design, minimisation of costs, reduction of risk and obstructions to the regular business operations were more important issues. In contrast, the locally rooted businesses were far more committed. Like the successful case of Asahikawa's Kaimono Kôen (See Chapter 3, §3.2.1) Bashamichi became an important actant, which inspired many similar projects in cities across the country. Furthermore, the designer of the mall, Takahashi Shiohiko became thereafter one of the leading designers for shopping street refurbishments in Japan.

Pedestrianisation of Isezaki Mall

Encouraged by the success of the prior Bashamichi revitalisation, young shop keepers in the abutting Isezaki Mall requested a renewal in 1978. While in Bashamichi traffic continued on a narrowed-down base, in Isezakichô a complete pedestrianisation was envisioned. Inspired by numerous earlier local government experiments with pedestrianisation, briefly before a new legislation was passed, which allowed for the designation of exclusive

'pedestrian roads'.¹⁷⁰ However, this new tool was not available for existing streets but was designed only for Newtown projects.

For this reason the project incurred resistance from MoC and also the municipal police again fiercely resisted against the allocation of benches in the middle of the mall, which were seen to obstruct a seamless servicing of the street with emergency vehicles. As most of the shopkeepers understood the necessity to distinguish themselves from the Diamond mall, only few resisted the removal of the typical Shôtengai roofing in front of their shops. Those who objected feared for the comfort of their clients on rainy days but as they were clearly in the minority the roof was nevertheless completely removed.


5.2.5 Expanding the Urban Design Activities

As we have seen, the development of urban design began with the creation of few initial symbolic public spaces, or punctiform projects. During the 1970s strategies for linear public spaces were devised, such as pedestrian malls, downtown promenades and from the 1980s on also river promenades.

Gradually area-wide administrative guidance was used to promote a unified development of whole districts, such as in the vicinity of Yamashita Park or Nihon Ôdori. Also the focus widened from a concentration of the historic Kannai centre to a consolidation of nodal areas in the suburbs; mostly around important transit hubs.

By the late 1980s, finally, these efforts were no longer limited to physical design. There was growing interest and concern for the cultural and historical assets of the city. Other soft methods were therefore devised to deepen the understanding and appreciation of good urban design. Illumination of historical sites was one means to literally shed light on Yokohama's architectural heritage. Since 1986 historical buildings are regularly illuminated at night and contribute to a more exciting nocturnal public space. Also important international symposia, conferences, competitions and exhibitions were hosted such as the Yokohama International Urban Design Forum (Nishiwaki 1992).

¹⁷⁰ This is a road, which is designated as such under city planning but otherwise closed to vehicular through traffic.



Graphic 5.10: The diagram shows the three-fold transformation of urban design in Yokohama. First, the urban design strategy developed from punctiform initial showcase projects, to linear schemes of promenades and greenways, towards district wide improvement schemes. In a second dimension it expanded from inner city public spaces to the creation of distinct, symbolic core areas of peripheral areas. In a third dimension the initial creation of 'hard' public spaces became complemented with 'soft' flanking activities, such as public art, light-up of buildings, events in public space, citizen workshops, international urban design conferences and so forth. In consequence this meant a shift from providing physical public space to the creation of a public sphere, in which the public good of the whole city was pluralistically negotiated between local government and the citizens. (From Yokohama n/a: 5)

5.3 INSTITUTIONALISED GUIDANCE FOR THE PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SPACE

5.3.1 Yokohama's Version of Incentive Zoning: the Urban Environmental Design System (UEDS)

For 40 years Incentive Zoning and POPS have been one component in the realisation of Yokohama's public space strategy. The City developed an own variant of the above discussed Comprehensive Design (See Chapter 4, §4.2.1) and to stress its unique character, named it Urban Environmental Design System (UEDS, *Shigaichi Kankyô Sekkei Seido* 市街地環境設計制度).

The Logic of the UEDS

The UEDS was concurrently set up with the new Senbiki system, the new land use zoning, and the height control areas in 1973. As discussed in the first part of chapter 4, the rapid swell of population caused an explosive, haphazard urban growth, in which public planning couldn't catch up with infrastructure provision such as roads, sidewalks, parks, schools and so forth. At the same time the first disputes over sunlight had erupted in the metropolitan area as the abolishment of the absolute height system now allowed for the construction of much higher buildings. Worse, the tense budgetary situation of the city didn't allow countering these conditions through internal financing. The city embraced therefore the new incentive planning tool of the Comprehensive Design System, which MoC had established in 1970 (See Chapter 4, §4.2.1). Creative utilisation of these instruments and guided private development would help to save public funds. The system would also allow increasing the open space ratio in the city, providing greenery and, through exceptional flexibilisation of building form regulations, promoting the construction of more beautiful buildings.

Difference to FAR and Comprehensive Design

The same hopes stood behind the introduction of the FAR system. However, apart from the limitation of the maximum building volume, planning authorities had no means to influence the design of the building or where an open space would be created on site. Furthermore, open spaces created by this system would not need to be open to public access. They could thus become a visual amenity or mitigate the microclimate, but would not become additional publicly usable urban space.



The national Comprehensive Design system would now allow incentivising the realisation of a good building design or of a POPS, following the above discussed minimum design standards regarding coherent shape, or frontage on public sidewalks. However, as there were no longer building height caps, the system principally allowed for unbounded, not foreseeable high buildings, depending on how much buildable land the developer could assemble. If the minimum conditions were met, the building authorities had to issue an as-of-right planning permit.

Establishing Limits and Guiding beyond

In an unparalleled move, the city set up City-wide height control areas¹⁷¹, which (re)established effective height caps and combined these with the lowest permissible FAR designations for the respective land use zones. Exemptions from height limitations were thereafter only permitted, if such waivers were compensated by creating POPS or, later, other bonusable amenities such as community facilities or the preservation of historical landmarks. The height caps plus the low FAR values would also mean that much more buildings than usual would become subject of such a design review, in which the planners could influence the building and open space design. Consequently, although the city area is significantly smaller than that of its giant neighbour Tōkyō, Yokohama's UEDS was almost as often applied (417 times until 2000) applied as the CDS in Tōkyō (456 times until 2000). In terms of the overall area of newly created POPS the difference is even less pronounced: 1.066.149 m² of POPS were realised in Yokohama versus 1.079.186 m² in Tōkyō (See graphic 4.4). Beyond that, the City also offered incentives for creating water front POPS along river promenades or the sea, as well as for the preservation of natural green areas (Katauke and Takahashi 1995). This designation was introduced to respond to the Kōhoku Newtown project. Here still ample natural open spaces were preserved and in order to maintain a high green coverage ratio and good environmental conditions this bonus was instituted. Also through-block connections were valued high in order to improve the connectivity of urban areas, which had developed unplanned before.

171 Even officials at the MLIT expressed their doubt in an interview if this practice actually conforms with existing legislation. Height control areas are normally only designated in specific limited areas but not for a whole city area. Given that the system wasn't challenged in court, the Ministry has been tolerating this practice until today. (Interview April 2004)

5.3.2 Excursus: Machizukuri Council Districts as additional, informal Planning Layer

As we have seen in the previous sections, from the beginning of the 1970s on the guided private development became an important element for the expansion of downtown pedestrian spaces. These in turn were part of a strategic city-wide vision of a public space network, which was devised in the latter half of the 1960s (See Graphic 5.4 (right)). Such early experiences of administrative guidance gradually led to an institutionalisation and generalisation of the system. Administrative guidance, which had evolved independently as a response of three different planning issues¹⁷², was finally fused to a unitary Machizukuri Council District system (MCD) (*Machizukuri Kyōgi Chiku* 街づくり協議地区) in 1986. It developed into a full-fledged additional, if informal and facultative, planning layer. Within these districts a concrete spatial vision (district masterplan) is developed through cooperation between the Urban Design Office, local residents and the business community. Its realisation is facilitated by a design guideline and in sensitive areas further backed by district plans. This system of extra-legal administrative guidance¹⁷³ addresses both the built-frame as well as the public open space. Stipulated are wall setbacks on private land in order to widen the pedestrian realm, stimulating public building uses in the ground floors, attractive building materials and colours, allocation of parking lots off important pedestrian areas, massing of buildings in order to maintain a sense of human-scale in public space, promotion of greenery as visual amenity, or control of advertisement displays and signboards around "dignified", symbolic civic spaces. Generally the district rules seek to complement scarce public space around important parks, symbolic buildings and important street intersections. Only after an urban design review process, where builders must prove the compliance of their plans with the district rules, an application for a building permit can be filed.

172 Rather than a coherent concept from the outset and managed by one public authority, administrative guidance evolved gradually as a response to 3 particular planning issues and was carried out by different departments: First, districts in which information about planned redevelopment projects was to be emanated to affected landowners (since 1972, by the Urban Redevelopment and City Planning Bureaus), Second, the relocation of factories to the Kanazawa land fill necessitated guided development in order to safeguard a comprehensive environmental improvement through the brownfield redevelopments (single 1976 by Planning and Coordination Bureau); Third, for the creation of attractive, coherent public spaces in the Kannai Area –integral part of the first big project (Since 1972 by Planning and Coordination Bureau). Only in 1986 the 3 different approaches were merged into one system, managed by one single authority (Horisaki 2000: 67).

173 See Sorensen (2002: 310-1) for a critical discussion on the evolution and practice of administrative guidance by local governments.



Objectives of MCDs


Objectives for the designation of Machizukuri Council Districts are:

- 1) Induction of office and retail functions for the formation of a strong business centre;
- 2) Support of downtown shopping streets such as Isezaki mall or Motomachi;
- 3) Ordering of traffic flows and parking, in order to improve the pedestrian environment;
- 4) Historic preservation around Nihon Ôdori, Bashamichi, Yamashita Park and in Yamate;
- 5) Creation of green axes at Ôdori Park;
- 6) Integration of the waterfront at Minato Mirai and Yamashita Park;
- 7) General control of building forms and uses; and
- 8) Involving residents and local business in drafting their own area guidelines (*Rûru Zukuri* ルールづくり) (Yokohama1999: 2).

While initially only designated in the Kannai area, in 1999 40 districts existed across Yokohama and covered 5.84 percent of the city area, corresponding to a total 2.551 hectares (ibid.). Also in suburban Yokohama MCDs became used to safeguard the evolution of coherent pedestrian spaces around stations and to induce building forms and functions, which vitalise public space (ibid.).

Inductive planning methods are used as complements to formal 'official' planning tools, provided by the legislator through City Planning Act, or Building Standard Act among others. They involve city making by a larger array of actors and mark the shift to a more partnership-type urban planning culture, which at times exceeds the legal frame. As extralegal administrative guidance, these instruments belong to the realm of negotiation, bargain and persuasion. Whereas formal regulation-type planning instruments stipulate nationwide uniform, quantitative, minimum standards, inductive planning tools are used to make farther-reaching provisions in response to the specific local conditions and to counter the homogenising effects of inflexible, uniform national rules.

The application of the inductive planning tools marks the shift from a planning where the public sector acts as chief producer and regulator of spatial production to one where it assumes the role of a facilitator, mediator and regulator and where the actual negotiation and creation of public space is left to private actors.



Graphic 5.11: While the initial Machizukuri Council Districts (MCD) only covered the central city area (red circle) in subsequent years the application of this facultative planning institute was expanded across the whole of Yokohama. (Yokohama 1999)



Relation of POPS, MCDs and UEDS

Beyond this mere quantitative consideration, the increasing integration, communication and cooperation within the planning administration, as well as the widening MCD designations contributed to the fact that POPS would often contribute to the complementation of an area development strategy laid down in a district masterplan. An own examination of the developments, which have made use of the UEDS indicated for example that despite the fact that MCDs only covered 6.5 percent of the city area, almost 54 percent of the POPS materialised in such districts.¹⁷⁴ A survey of the 40 MCDs¹⁷⁵ in 2004 revealed that in many of these districts design guidelines had been established, which would guide the future spatial development there. In 60 percent of the MCDs wall set backs on private plots had been stipulated in the form of sidewalk widenings (72.5 percent), plazas (12.5 percent) or waterfront POPS (27.5 percent). Once a development would materialise here, the additional planning layer of the MCD would cause a better integration of the building with its urban context. Furthermore, in 65 percent of the districts also additional machizukuri councils existed, which promoted the area development and also guarded the compliance with the design code. This meant then, if a developer wanted to utilise incentive zoning within a MCD, he would not only have to consult with the planning authorities but also with the local machizukuri organisation. This promotes then a further integration of a development with its urban context, if district rules have been set up and the organisation takes an active stance.

Subsequent Transformations of the UEDS

Initially, after its establishment in 1973 the UEDS was also applicable for building plots smaller than 500 m² in order to encourage a wider redevelopment activity in all types of city areas and the FA bonus was calculated proportionally to the width of provided sidewalks.

In 1985 a first fundamental revision took place, induced by the following factors. First, by this time many new developments had created ample pedestrian spaces in central city areas.

174 List of UEDS applications kindly provided by Urban Development Bureau of Yokohama City.

175 Refer to homepage of the Urban Development Bureau Yokohama:
<http://www.city.yokohama.jp/me/toshi/dtech/kyogi/index.html>.

Throughout the 1970s the situation had been marked by rapid urban growth, which necessitated ad-hoc countermeasures. Also the UEDS had been devised as such. By the 1980s, however, urban growth gradually stabilised and therefore a comprehensive consolidation and fundamental restructuring of the now existing, built up area had to take place.

Second, after mayor Asukata and Tamura Akira had left office, new plans, concepts and visions were drawn up and the system had to be adjusted accordingly.

Third, the 1970s were the age of quick, highly symbolic, but spatially constrained show case projects to demonstrate the reform drive of the new government to the citizens. In the 1980s slowly the large-scale projects materialised, which had been initiated in the previous decade, e.g. Minato Mirai 21 and others of the 6 big projects.

Fourth, the view on environmental development had changed. No longer was the mere provision of basic circulation infrastructure the objective, but also the cultivation of downtown retail and office functions, historical preservation or the creation of cultural facilities were all now promoted through the UEDS.

Consequently the following changes were made to the system in 1985 (Horisaki 2000: 86):


- 1) Expansion of POPS menu, with the preservation of natural green space as bonusable amenity;
- 2) Inclusion of historical preservation as bonusable amenity;
- 3) Prioritisation of interior POPS with a high degree of publicness as response to the developments in Minato Mirai 21; and
- 4) FAR bonus for the creation of urban business functions in order to stimulate the formation of an own independent and strong business centre in Yokohama vis-à-vis its giant competitor Tōkyō.

Later revisions in 1987 and 1995 added to and differentiated the POPS menu and responded to changes in the national planning legislation. However, as was the case with the previously discussed CDS (See Chapter 4, §4.2.1), also the UEDS regulations were not changed in such a way to press for a higher design quality of the actual POPS.

5.3.3 Evaluation of POPS created through the UEDS

Quantitative Evaluation

Let us now take closer look at the spaces created through the UEDS. Indeed, compared to other Japanese cities the results of the last 40 years are encouraging, as some of the above discussed problems were overcome. Until 2004 across the entire city area 444 privately owned public spaces have been produced at office, residential, and community facility buildings, equalling a size 7 times of Hibiya Park (See also Chart 4.4). Where have these spaces been built? How does their quantity relate to population densities?



Graphic 5.12: Distribution of public parks (green columns) and POPS (red columns) across Yokohama City by ward in relation to population density. The majority of POPS is located in the densely populated downtown but their median size is small compared to those, produced in large suburban housing estates in Tsuzuki. These are however well supplied with public parks. (Author, Compiled from Yokohama 2003 and UEDS list, courtesy Yokohama City)

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Only within a spatially limited downtown area, partly located in the central wards Naka, Minami, Nishi and Kanagawa 133 POPS have been created, of which 98 (74 percent) are located within MCDs. Of 48 POPS in the vicinity of Yokohama station, 29 cluster in the relatively small area north-west of the station where they complement the system of publicly owned public spaces. In the Kannai area many historical buildings were preserved through incentive zoning. Along Yamashita Park plazas were created around important intersections and sidewalks were broadened. While these central city POPS appear as small and fragmented, with the exception of the redevelopment area Minato Mirai and Portside District, POPS in the suburban housing estates are much more spacious. It is however these areas, which are best supplied with public parks.


Qualitative Evaluation

Reg. Number	Name and Address of Building	MCD	Connection to Existing Open	Kind of Open Space		
0001	ybs minami saiwai building	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> III	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Park <input type="checkbox"/> River <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Side-walk		
Date	Time	Weather	Height	Adj. floor (1/2)	Overall Building Use/Neighbouring	Land Use Zone
04/04/02	11:30	windy, cloudy	9	visual functional	office commercial/ office	shogyo
Amenities provided in open space						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Plaque, Sign [UEDS] [number: ___]		<small>[reposition, □ primary space, □ usable residual space, □ visual residual space, □ height levels, □ level parts, □ contour/ elevated parts, □ general water space, □ bicycle stand, □ subway exit, □ contact to sidewalk, □ space and building entrance, □ position surveillance camera, □ position of plate]</small>				
<input type="checkbox"/> None		Picture: 				
<input type="checkbox"/> Artwork [number: ___]		Plan: 				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Barrier-free Design to fronting sidewalk only						
<input type="checkbox"/> Bicycle Parking [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Climate Control						
<input type="checkbox"/> Drinking Fountain [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Escalator [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Food Service						
<input type="checkbox"/> Lighting [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Litter Receptacles [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Programs [type: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Restroom [number: ___]						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Retail Frontage [60 % frontage]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Seating [Mov. Chairs] [number: ___]						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Seating [Ledge] [5 meter]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Subway/ Bus stop						
<input type="checkbox"/> Sitting space Kiosk, Café [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Tables [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Trees in Space [Large] [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Trees in Space [Medium] [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Trees on Street [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Water Feature [number: ___]						
<input type="checkbox"/> Others []						
Properties						
Openness of Space	Connectivity	Harmonisation with Sidewalk level	Attribute Col.Mat	Quality of Materials		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fully Open Air <input type="checkbox"/> Partly open air <input type="checkbox"/> Fully indoor	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partly <input type="checkbox"/> Non	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partly <input type="checkbox"/> Non	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partly <input type="checkbox"/> Non	<input type="checkbox"/> Primary Space <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Usable Residual Space <input type="checkbox"/> Visual Residual Space	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low	<input type="checkbox"/> Others []
Access Limitation						
<input type="checkbox"/> Guard	<input type="checkbox"/> Fence, Gate	<input type="checkbox"/> Construction [from ___ unit]	<input type="checkbox"/> Closing Hours [day ___ time ___]	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Encroachment [type: barrier against ___]	<input type="checkbox"/> Others []	
Users						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employees	<input type="checkbox"/> Residents	<input type="checkbox"/> Neighbours	<input type="checkbox"/> Children	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Passers-by	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Others [facility users]	
Valuation						
<input type="checkbox"/> Destination	<input type="checkbox"/> Neighbourhood	<input type="checkbox"/> Hiatus	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Circulation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Marginal	<input type="checkbox"/> Others []	


Graphic 5.13: Sample of a survey sheet. (Author)

Yokohama was carried out (See Graphic 5.13 for an exemplary survey sheet).

Because excel spreadsheets of planning authorities easily declare a space as a plaza-type POPS if it is only wider than 4 meters, it is misleading to talk about the quality of different spaces without actually seeing them. The POPS inventory of Yokohama City, although being more differentiated than that available from TMG, distinguished only in general (plaza)-type, sidewalk widening-type and through-block-type POPS, as well as those along waterfronts and natural green spaces. But what do those spaces look like? How are they usable in reality? To answer this question an own survey of 133 POPS in central



Graphic 5.14: The graphic shows the survey area of 133 POPS in central Yokohama, located within the Kanagawa, Nishi, Minami and Naka wards. Aim of the survey was providing a sturdier, representative picture of the actual condition of POPS; their maintenance condition, layout, connections to other public spaces, or design quality. The orange dots with item number attached mark the study cases. Orange lines are designated urban promenades, in green appear major public parks and hatched, grey areas mark MCDs. It becomes clear that most POPS are located in city area, where local design codes have been set up. The red rectangles shows the Yokohama station area and Minato Mirai 21, to be shown more detailed in Graphics 5.17 and 5.18. (Author)




Graphic 5.15: Actual condition of the 133 surveyed POPS in central Yokohama. The red tones indicate spaces, which were identified as pure circulation and hiatus spaces. In greens and blue appear such spaces, which invited to stay by high design quality, or good furnishing with amenities. (Author)

Judging from the data, provided by Yokohama city of all the POPS 41 percent would be plaza-type space, where it could be suspected that they invite a certain degree of activities, exceeding the mere circulation function. 50 percent of all spaces were declared as side walk substitutes, where no sidewalk existed, or as sidewalk widening-type of POPS. Not more than pure facilitation of circulation was to be expected from these spaces. Nine percent

were declared through-block connections, which would connect two streets at opposing sites of the property and one percent was marked as waterfront space. The survey has indicated, however, that only 18 percent could be qualified as destination spaces, which would allow for a purposeful pleasant stay and encourage a wider range of diverse activities, or would be at least visually stimulating (Graphic 5.15). The vast majority of 82 percent appeared as pure circulation or hiatus spaces such as substitute sidewalks, sidewalk widenings, through-block connections or arcades. These clearly help to ameliorate pedestrian congestion in regular sidewalks and visually widen the public realm, but offer little more to the public beyond that (Graphic 5.16).

Since the size of POPS correlates with the overall development size, the biggest spaces are found in suburban areas where residential densities are relatively low while in the dense city centre the median size of POPS is much smaller and more fragmented. It became clear that many spaces were encroached by adjacent commercial functions, abused as outdoor storage for merchandises and shop displays. As a major problem appeared uncontrolled bicycle parking, which rendered some of the POPS unusable. The maintenance standard was relatively low, if tended to at all. Often the most basic amenities were lacking and only very few of the surveyed spaces had

primary seating such as benches or movable chairs. Often even planters or ledges were absent, making it difficult to use the POPS other than for walking.



Graphic 5.16: Although POPS in Yokohama are a part of wider area development strategies and although they are one important component of a long-term public space strategy, often the design quality of particular places does not encourage a wider use beyond the mere circulation function. (Author)


Consequently, the best spaces in terms of design quality, network integration and maintenance quality were found in the latest, most recent housing developments where housing developers have to compete in recent years for new tenants as the housing markets had turned from a seller's market into a buyer's market (Chapter 3, §3.5.2). In the large redevelopment areas of Portside District and Minato Mirai 21, spectacular destination spaces are to be found (Graphic 5.17). Similar to the preceding OMY case study (Chapter 4, §4.3.8), the landowners (among them Mitsubishi Real Estate as owner of the former shipyard and key player in the planning process) developed a detailed design guideline in cooperation with the authorities and concluded a machizukuri agreement, which safeguarded its realisation. High quality public spaces were here both important for the developers, but also for the city, which understood the site as a showcase future development, as the name Minato Mirai (= future port) already suggests. Quality became consequently ever more important after the burst of the economic bubble in 1990, when the project ran into financial difficulties. In order to keep land values high, attractive and active environments had to be kept up. In terms of network connectivity the area north-west of Yokohama was most notable.

Of all the 133 downtown POPS as many as 48 materialised in the wider vicinity of Yokohama station whereas 29 cluster in the relatively compact office district (Graphic 5.18). Setbacks from the property line are stipulated here in the MCD guideline and accordingly most of the developments


respected the regulation. The POPS contribute here therefore to a widening of the sidewalks, but on the other hand, other than a few sculptures, they do not offer much to stop by. It is then highly questionable that other people flock by except for those, who have to attend to business here.

Summary UEDS

The discussion has shown that Yokohama City took great efforts to integrate incentive zoning in a comprehensive planning system. Other than in any major city of the country, low FAR designations together with building height caps made it possible for planning authorities to request a design review before the building permit was granted. In order to respond to the specific characteristics of the harbour town the creation of further waterfront and the preservation of natural green spaces was promoted through granting floor area bonuses. Also historical preservation became a bonusable amenity in order to preserve the unique heritage of early modern buildings in the Kannai area. This in turn greatly promoted the issue of historic preservation nationwide. However, in qualitative terms a survey indicated that only a small number of inner city POPS were more than pure circulation or hiatus spaces. Even if most of the spaces themselves are not so spectacular, the legal frame of low FAR values, coupled with building height limitations has protected downtown Yokohama so far from the construction of too many too high buildings.



Graphic 5.17: In Minato Mirai 21 high quality POPS are an integral part of a comprehensive public space network. (Adapted from MM 21 2004: 2-3)



Graphic 5.18: A survey of 133 POPS was carried out in central Yokohama in 2004. The plans exemplarily show the results for a part of an MCD north-west of Yokohama Station. Of 48 POPS created in the wider station vicinity, as many as 29 cluster densely north-west of it. POPS significantly contribute here to a widening of the public street space. Beyond that, these spaces contribute little to invite more public activities. (Author)

5.4 INTERMEDIARY CONCLUSION


Chapter 5 has taken a long-term longitudinal perspective on the urban governance and planning culture of one *particular* city — Yokohama, Japan's second largest city and one of the most progressive local governments.

This case study then stood for the growing number of innovative cities such as Sendai, Kobe, or Hiroshima, whose concerted *networking* (in an ANT sense, see Chapter I, §I.4) efforts accumulated subsequently in revisions of initially diverting central government policies. In Yokohama through a long-term strategic planning vision, developed during the second half of the 1960s by young, progressive planners around Tamura Akira and politically backed by the newly elected reform mayor Asukata Ichio, a comprehensive public space system was created over a period of 40 years. The concept sought to connect major parks, riversides, the harbour, historical quarters as well as key entertainment and shopping streets through pedestrian promenades. The underlying concern was the reclamation of a human-scale pedestrian environment from the increasingly vehicle centred city.

A lack of public funds and the promise of the reform government to be frugal with tax payer's money led to the evolution of a unique cooperative planning culture. Long before the term public-private-partnership became a catchword in the promotion of the latest redevelopment schemes like OMY (Chapter 4, §4.3.8) or SIO Site Shiodome (Chapter 4, §4.3.4), in Yokohama planning authorities sought to harmonise private developments with the city's long-term strategic planning vision. For its incremental realisation, private development was guided in such a way, that it would complement the outlined public space network at strategic places.

Through intensive publications, intensive utilisation of external planning expertise, subsequent deliberations in the public sphere of planning experts and in the broader public later, this unique urban design approach exerted a strong influence on public space policies of many other local governments. Finally, in the accumulation of an increasing number of other successful cases this contributed to a changed attitude of the national government towards the liveable city.

With the early emphasis on the utilisation of private initiative and the strong reform drive of parts of the planning administration, this chapter takes up a hybrid position between the previous two chapters 3 and 4 and serves as an important example for a more integrated, strategic, long-term municipal planning practice. The chapter also proved that some committed local governments took steps to develop a more qualitative understanding of public space from the mid-1960s on, closely associated with the evolution of international urban design and machizukuri movements in Japan.



Graphic 5.15: The case study has demonstrated a new urban planning culture. Conventionally, local government departments act as the lowest-tier agencies of the corresponding national authorities, rather than understanding themselves as one part of an integrated local government administration (left). The early effort of Tamura and Asukata was to establish an independent, integrated, cross-cutting administration, in which all the related departments would jointly act as *one* local government "for the citizens" (right) and not as mere extensions of higher-tier authorities. (Adapted from Minohara 2005 40, 2)

Inductive planning methods came to be used as complements to formal 'official' planning tools, provided by the City Planning Act or Building Standard Act. They involve city making by a larger array of actors and mark a shift to a partnership-type planning culture, which at times exceeded the legally prescribed frame. As administrative guidance, these instruments belong to the realm of negotiation, bargain and persuasion.

Whereas formal regulation-type planning tools stipulate nationwide uniform, quantitative, minimum standards, inductive planning tools are used to make farther-reaching provisions in response to specific local conditions. The application of the inductive planning tools marks the shift from a planning where the public sector acts as chief producer and regulator of spatial production to one where it assumes the role of a facilitator, mediator and regulator and where the actual negotiation and creation of public space is left to private actors.